

## BotRevealer: Behavioral Detection of Botnets based on Botnet Life-cycle

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### Abstract

Nowadays, botnets are considered as essential tools for planning serious cyber attacks. Botnets are used to perform various malicious activities such as DDoS attacks and sending spam emails. Different approaches are presented to detect botnets; however most of them may be ineffective when there are only a few infected hosts in monitored network, as they rely on similarity in bots activities to detect the botnet. In this paper, we present a host-based method that can detect individual bot-infected hosts. This approach is based on botnet life-cycle, which includes common symptoms of almost all types of botnet despite their differences. We analyze network activities of each process running on the host and propose some heuristics to distinguish behavioral patterns of bot process from legitimate ones based on statistical features of packet sequences and evaluating an overall security risk for it. To show the effectiveness of the approach, a tool named BotRevealer has been implemented and evaluated using real botnets and several popular applications. The results show that in spite of diversity of botnets, BotRevealer can effectively detect the bot process among other active processes.

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## 1 Introduction

The majority of attacks and malicious activities in the Internet are made by malware. Botnet is a network of malware-infected computers, which is considered as a basic tool to conduct cyber attacks. In fact, botnet is a network of coordinated compromised computers (bots) which are controlled remotely by an attacker (botmaster) through a command and control channel without the knowledge of their owners. Botnets are used to perform various malicious activities such as distributed denial of service attacks, spam, click fraud, scams and hosting phishing sites. That is

why today botnets are identified as one of the largest threats to Internet security [1]. Since botmasters use popular protocols such as IRC, HTTP and P2P as their C&C channel, botnet traffic is usually permitted by firewalls. On the other hand, there is a text-based traffic between botmaster and their bots, and it is sometimes encrypted to evade detection. Furthermore, a bot often remains silent until receiving a command from its botmaster to do malicious activities.

Botnet developers are constantly changing their methods to avoid detection and to make the existing detection methods ineffective. Using P2P protocols rather than using IRC protocol and lately leveraging HTTP protocol such as C&C channel is an example of this trend.

Various approaches are proposed to detect botnets.

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Some methods adapt bot signatures with previously known bad signatures [2], and [3]. These approaches often depend upon the command and control protocol and need access to the content of packet payload or binary package. The approaches may be bypassed if there is encrypted traffic between bot and botmaster or if some changes applied to the bot signature through hiding techniques such as polymorphism techniques. Some other methods detect botnets based on similar or coordinated network activities [4–6]. These methods can be ineffective if there is only a single individual bot in the monitored network. Another set of methods detect botnets relying on one or more bot particular behaviors [7–10]. These methods, however, realize a more effective approach than the two previous set of methods, but with small changes in bot specific behaviors they can be completely inefficient. Additionally, due to the fact that most of the bot specific behaviors belong to attack phase of botnet life-cycle, bot detection is delayed until observation of final malicious activities.

To overcome the limitations of each of the three aforementioned categories, we focus on botnet life-cycle and present a host-based method to detect a single individual bot-infected host based on the bot process activities in different phases of life-cycle. Our method is based on the idea that botnet life-cycle can be considered as a general signature of almost all types of botnets and a bot distinction from other malware. Relying on this general signature, we will be able to detect botnets whether they are known or unknown. We examine our method by a new bot instance to assess its capability in detection of unknown botnets, and get very successful results.

In our work, we collect a sequence of TCP/UDP activities of each process in monitored hosts. The traffic is splitted into multiple slices based on the arrival time of packets, and then a profile from each slice is extracted which are then used to distinguish bot process from legitimate ones using some heuristics.

The main contributions of this paper are as follows:

- (1) A host-based method is proposed to detect individual bot-infected host in its early steps of activation, e.g., in a few hours. This method can also detect encrypted channels.
- (2) We propose a protocol/structure independent method which is robust against botnet evading techniques.
- (3) We devise five general behavioral patterns of bot traffic and new heuristics to detect these patterns.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study botnet life-cycle as a basic concept

for the proposed method. Section 3 describes our proposed approach, named BotRevealer, in detail. The implementation issues and experiment results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, conclusion and future work are presented in Section 5.

## 2 Botnet Life-cycle

Different botnets despite their differences often do similar steps and actions during their lifetime, which is called the botnet life-cycle. Having better understanding of these steps and bot behaviors in each phase of the botnet life-cycle, we will be able to improve detection accuracy and response to botnet threats.

Studying previous researches [11–13], we describe botnet life-cycle as following seven steps:

- (1) Spread and infection,
- (2) Secondary injection,
- (3) Hiding and securing,
- (4) Rallying/bootstrapping,
- (5) Command and control,
- (6) Attack,
- (7) Remove and release.

In spread and infection phase, botmaster tries to maximize his bot army via infecting new hosts using a variety of methods such as propagation in the local network through shared folder, trick the user to run an infected program or to visit malicious web pages. After a successful infection, bot binary often needs to be downloaded and run on the infected host to turning it into a bot. Then bot tries to hide its presence by some actions such as disabling firewall or preventing anti-virus software from being updated. Now bot process tries to connect to its command and control server or peers address, which is hard-coded in bot binary or found through an alternative method. When bot successfully connect to its server or peer, it will be a new member of the botnet. After this the command and control phase will be started. In this phase, bot is ready to receive commands from its botmaster and perform specified actions. Botmaster may have some conversations with his bot to obtain required information about it e.g., OS version. Furthermore, botmaster may command their bots to update their binary to prevent them from being detected or or improving their functionality. Botmaster may command his bots to do any malicious activities such as participating in a DDoS attack, sending spam emails, harvesting sensitive information which is known as attack phase. In some situations, botmaster may decide to leave his bot and remove any footprint on the infected host. These operations are known as remove and release phase.

Our proposed approach discovers bot symptoms in

three different phases: rallying, command and control and the attack phases. The main focus is in two former phases, and therefore, bot presence will be unfolded in earlier stage of the bot life-cycle.

### 3 Proposed Botnet Detection Method

In Section 1, we mentioned some previous researches that state some particular behavioral patterns of bot traffic. We studied most of these behavioral patterns in rallying, command and control and attack phases of botnet life-cycle and summarized them as mentioned in Table 2. In order to identify these behavioral patterns, we define some general behavioral patterns and their traffic symptoms according to Table 3.

Table 1. Profile parameters for a group of packets ( $P_g$ )

Parameter	Description
Index	Group number
Duration	Group duration time
StartPacket	Start packet of the group
ReceiveCount	Number of Receive packets
SendCount	Number of Send packets
Distance	Distance from previous group

Table 2. Behavioral patterns of bot traffic

Phase	Behavioral Pattern
Rallying	Sending SYN packets periodically to one or more specific IP
	Numerous opened local ports used to connect to one or more specific IP
Command and control	A permanent connection every time the infected host connects to Internet
	Begin the conversation from outside of the host
	Large size or numerous response packets against a small and little number of incoming packet
	A permanent and often idle connection
	Continuous operation without user interaction
Attack	Fast response to incoming packet
	Frequent and similar response packets
	One-way connection drop and existing un-responded packets
	Port scanning
	Packet flooding
	A lot of connection attempts and failures

In order to detect defined general behavioral patterns, we collect transition layer traffic of all processes in term of TCP or UDP packets and divide the whole traffic of each process into smaller slices based on inter-arrival time of each two successive packets. In other words, we aim to identify groups of packets, which are related to a specific communicative operation of the process.

Any two successive packets, such that the time difference between their arrival times is less than a threshold value,  $\tau$  are placed in a single group. Thus, upon observing a new packet, it belongs to previous group, if inter-arrival time between this packet and previous one is less than  $\tau$ , otherwise it will start a new group.

To get the more accurate results, we need to take a suitable value for  $\tau$  by which all packets associated with a particular command and control activity, be grouped together. We choose  $\tau$  value based on some experiences on botnet traffic.

#### 3.1 Profile Extraction

We have to collect information about each group to be analyzed afterwards. Collected information about each group is saved in a profile named  $P_g$ . In fact,  $P_g$  is a statistical profile of the corresponding group of packets in terms of desired parameters that have been seen in Table 4.

#### 3.2 Profile Analysis

In order to analyze the extracted profiles from traffic of a particular process, we need to look for certain statistical evidences in its corresponding data structures. Thus, we are able to identify each general behavioral pattern mentioned in Table 3. To detect these behavioral patterns we define five new heuristics and related threshold variables namely  $\delta_1$ ,  $\delta_2$ ,  $\delta_3$ ,  $\delta_4$  and  $\delta_5$  to analyze data structures.

Pseudocode 1 depicts simple descriptions of detection rules of patterns.

Detection of any of the above mentioned behaviors causes an increase in risk of the related process.

## 4 Implementation and Experiments


To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we used real bots in a local area networks consisting of some virtual machines. We run three virtual machines as botmaster, C&C server and victim machine. To have a rigorous evaluation, some real bots with some common legitimate applications were run in hosts. We used Spybot as an IRC-based bot, Zeus as an HTTP-based bot and a remote administration tool called

**Table 3.** General behavioral patterns and their traffic symptoms

Phase	General behavioral pattern	Behavior description	Traffic symptoms
Rallying	Try to connect	Try to connect to somewhere outside of the host periodically	Observation of periodic occurrence of “Open” and “Connect” TCP packets without any “Send” or “Receive” packet
	Keep alive Connection (Heart Pulse)	Try to determine connection status and keep it alive periodically	Observation of periodic exchange of “Send”/“Receive” packets
Command and Control, Attack	Remote start	Wait for receiving a command to do some operations	Observation of a “Receive” packet before occurrence of any “Send” packet in a group of packets
	Mostly sending	Generally try to send some information or do some attack	Observation of “Send” packets more than “Receive” packets
	Lightweight connection	Connection is mostly idle until receiving command	Observation of low rate of “Send” and “Receive” packets in a connection

**Table 4.** Profile parameters for a group of packets (pg)

Description	Parameter
Group number	Index
Group duration time	Duration
Start packet of the group	StartPacket
Number of Send packets	SendCount
Number of Receive packets	ReceiveCount
Distance from previous group	Distance

**Figure 1.**  $\delta_1$  value analysis

198 NuclearRAT as three malicious processes to evalu-  
 199 ate our method using false negative value. We also  
 200 used some popular programs such as Yahoo messen-  
 201 ger, Google Talk and Mozilla Firefox to inspect our  
 202 method for false positive rate. We collected approx-  
 203 imately one-hour traffic of each application for our  
 204 experiment.

205 We used an off-the-shelf tool called DiamondCS  
 206 Port Explorer to collect and log TCP/UDP activi-  
 207 ties of processes. We wrote approximately 500 lines  
 208 of Perl code to analyze outputs of this tool to catego-  
 209 rize TCP/UDP packets, extract profiles and discover  
 210 general behavioral patterns to detect possible bot  
 211 processes.

#### 212 4.1 Threshold Variable Analysis

213 To achieve the best values for threshold variables, we  
 214 examined a range of values for these variables. To  
 215 find the best value, we study the effect of different  
 216 values on false positive (FP) and false negative (FN)  
 217 rates. FP value shows the number of detections of  
 218 legitimate programs as a malicious ones., whereas FN  
 219 value shows the number of bot processes that were  
 220 not detected.

221 As an example, FN and FP values are calculated  
 222 for different values of  $\delta_1$  and are shown in Figure 1.

223 FN and FP values are also calculated for different  
 224 possible values of  $\delta_2$ ,  $\delta_3$ ,  $\delta_4$  and  $\delta_5$  variables in the  
 225 same way. Best value for threshold variables  $\delta_1$  to  $\delta_5$   
 226 are 5, 4, 0.8, 0.8 and 0.2, respectively.

#### 227 4.2 Detection Accuracy

228 Evaluation results are shown in Table 8. These results  
 229 are obtained when the parameters are set as  $\tau = 3$ ,  
 230 and  $\delta_1$  to  $\delta_5$  are set to 5, 3, 0.7, 1 and 0.2, respectively.  
 231 We can see that BotRevealer is successfully able to  
 232 detect bot processes among other benign applications.  
 233 Unlike [14], our method shows that it is possible to  
 234 detect general behaviors of bots in a few hours during  
 235 botnet activities.

236 To determine the accuracy in detection of each gen-  
 237 eral behavior pattern, we calculate some accuracy  
 238 metrics as shown in Table 5. In this table,  $N_{TP}$ ,  $N_{FP}$   
 239 and  $N_{FN}$  are the number of true positive, false posi-  
 240 tive and false negative, respectively. The parameters  
 241 are calculated based on the best values of each thresh-  
 242 old variable and are shown in Table 6. The results  
 243 of calculation of accuracy parameters for each gen-  
 244 eral behavioral pattern are shown in Table 7. This

**Pseudocode 1** General Behavioral Patterns Detection Rules

```

1: function DETECTTRYTOCONNECT(profiles)
2:    $TC \leftarrow$  all profiles that  $SendCount = 0$  and
    $ReceiveCount = 0$ 
3:    $D[i] \leftarrow$  number of profiles in  $TC$  where
    $Distance = i$ 
4:    $M \leftarrow$  maximum value in array  $D$ 
5:   if  $M \geq \delta_1$  then return TRY_TO_CONNECT
6:   end if
7: end function
8: function DETECTHEARTPULSE(profiles)
9:    $TC \leftarrow$  all profiles that  $SendCount > 0$  and
    $ReceiveCount > 0$  and  $Distance \geq \tau \cdot \delta_2$ 
10:   $D[i] \leftarrow$  number of profiles in  $TC$  where  $Distance =$ 
    $i$ 
11:   $M \leftarrow$  maximum value in array  $D$ 
12:  if  $M \geq \delta_1$  then return HEART_PULSE
13:  end if
14: end function
15: function DETECTREMOTESTART(profiles)
16:   $TC \leftarrow$  all profiles such that  $SendCount > 0$ 
17:  and  $ReceiveCount > 0$  and  $Distance \geq \tau \cdot \delta_2$ 
18:   $P \leftarrow$  number of profiles in  $TC$  where
    $StartPacket = \text{"Receive"}$ 
19:   $Q \leftarrow$  number of profiles in  $TC$  where
    $StartPacket = \text{"Send"}$ 
20:  if  $P/Q \geq \delta_3$  then return REMOTE_START
21:  end if
22: end function
23: function DETECTMOSTLYSENDING(profiles)
24:   $TC \leftarrow$  all profiles
25:   $S \leftarrow$  sum of  $SendCount$  values in  $TC$ 
26:   $R \leftarrow$  sum of  $ReceiveCount$  values in  $TC$ 
27:  if  $S/R \geq \delta_4$  then return MOSTLY_SENDING
28:  end if
29: end function
30: function DETECTLIGHTWEIGHTCONNECTION(profiles)
31:   $TC \leftarrow$  all profiles
32:   $S \leftarrow$  sum of  $SendCount$  values in  $TC$ 
33:   $R \leftarrow$  sum of  $ReceiveCount$  values in  $TC$ 
34:   $T \leftarrow$  sum of  $Distance$  +
    $Duration$  values in  $TC$ 
35:  if  $\frac{S+R}{T} \leq \delta_5$  then return LIGHTWEIGHT_CONNECTION
36:  end if
37: end function

```

**Table 6.** NTP, NFP and NFN values

Variable	Value	FP	FN	TP
$\delta_1$	5	0	0	3
$\delta_2$	4	2	1	2
$\delta_3$	0.8	1	0	3
$\delta_4$	0.8	0	1	2
$\delta_5$	0.2	2	1	2

**Table 7.** Experimental results for behavioral patterns

Behavioral pattern	Precision	Recall	F-measure
Try to connect	1	1	1
Keep alive connection	0.77	0.87	0.82
Remote start	0.89	1	0.94
Mostly send	1	0.90	0.95
Idle connection	0.77	0.87	0.82

**Table 5.** Accuracy Metric

Accuracy Metric	Formulation
Precision	$\frac{N_{tp}}{N_{tp} + N_{fp}}$
Recall	$\frac{N_{tp}}{N_{tp} + N_{fn}}$
F-measure	$\frac{2 * Precision * Recall}{Precision + Recall}$

We test BotRevealer with a new botnet namely Kelihos botnet to evaluate its capability in detection of new bots. This bot is available in a dataset which was created by the CVUT Malware Capture Facility Project [15] and can be downloaded with the name CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-25. BotRevealer successfully detected it as a bot and it shows its effectiveness in detecting new bots.

**4.3 Comparison with Previous Work**

Table 9 provides different capabilities of BotRevealer in comparison with other botnet detection methods. In [16] some detection criteria for comparative analysis of botnet detection techniques are presented, but these criteria are general for all IDS techniques. However, we define new criteria more specific for botnet detection. As demonstrated in this table, our method has some significant features in detecting botnets. The symbol (\*) indicates the feature is supported by the method. As seen, BotRevealer discovers botnet via life-cycle as a general signature, detects botnet activities in early stages and finds individual bot-infected host independent of its C&C protocol and content of packets. BotRevealer does not rely on known signatures of bots, but it discovers a general signature of

table shows that BotRevealer is able to distinguish bot processes among other legitimate processes in the operating system.

272 almost all kinds of botnets; therefore, it will be able  
273 to detect unknown new bots.

## 274 5 Conclusion and Future Work

275 In this paper, we described the botnet life-cycle as a  
276 general signature of almost all types of botnets despite  
277 their differences and the bot distinction from other  
278 malware. BotRevealer discovers botnet leveraging life-  
279 cycle as a general signature, mostly in early stages  
280 and detect individual bot-infected host independent  
281 of its C&C protocol and content of packets. We show  
282 that our method is able to detect general behaviors of  
283 bots in a few hours during botnet activities. However,  
284 BotRevealer requires running in inspected hosts and  
285 collecting network traffic on the host. Thus, it may  
286 cause processing and storage overhead in the hosts.

287 In future, we will try to identify general behavioral  
288 patterns of bots in system calls level and extract  
289 system call profiles to analyze these profiles along  
290 with network traffic profiles. Furthermore, we will try  
291 to take advantage of machine learning techniques to  
292 find best threshold values in our method.

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**Table 8.** Experimental results

Application	NIC traffic heuristic analysis (Traffic behavior)					Risk Value	Result
	pattern 1	pattern 2	pattern 3	pattern 4	pattern 5		
Spybot	*	*	*	*	*	100%	Bot
NuclearRAT	*	*	*	*	-	80%	Bot
Zeus	*	-	*	-	*	60%	Bot
Yahoo Messenger	-	*	-	-	-	20%	-
Google Talk	-	-	*	-	*	40%	-
Skype	-	*	-	-	-	20%	-
Emule	-	-	-	-	-	0%	-
BitTorrent	-	*	*	-	-	40%	-
CuteFTP	-	-	-	-	-	0%	-
Firefox	-	-	-	-	-	0%	-
Opera	-	-	-	-	*	20%	-

**Table 9.** Detection capability comparison

Detection methods	General signature detection	Individual bot detection	Unknown bot detection	Detection in earlier stage	Encrypted C&C	Protocol/Structure-Independent
Rishi [2]	-	*	-	*	-	-
BotHunter [3]	*	-	*	*	*	-
BotMiner [5]	-	-	*	-	*	*
BotRevealer	*	*	*	*	*	*